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CROSBY AND THE "ONE-VOICE" MYTH IN U.S.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
SARAH H. CLEVELAND*
N Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,' the Supreme Court invali-
.dated a Massachusetts government procurement statute that barred
state entities from doing business with companies that did business in
Burma. The plaintiffs, an organization of private companies with foreign
operations, challenged the law on constitutional and statutory preemption
grounds, arguing that it improperly conflicted with federal foreign rela-
tions authority. The Supreme Court limited its holding to implied statu-
tory preemption, finding that the Massachusetts provision improperly
compromised the President's ability "to speak for the Nation with one
voice."12 Crosby thus joined a long line of decisions in which the Supreme
Court has applied the "one-voice" doctrine to address the validity of state
activities impinging on foreign relations.
The "one-voice" doctrine is a myth. It finds little support in the con-
stitutional framework, which divides the foreign relations powers among
the three federal branches, and even less in the actual practice of the gov-
ernment. Congress and the President have full power to expressly pre-
empt state and local interference with foreign affairs, and they have
exercised that power on occasion. But even more often they have toler-
ated, deferred to or even encouraged state and local measures impacting
on foreign affairs. Neither Congress nor the President had expressly pre-
empted the Massachusetts law at issue in Crosby, despite ample opportunity
to do so. Quite to the contrary, repeated actions by both branches sug-
gested an intent to tolerate the Massachusetts law. In the face of our con-
stitutional history and this substantial evidence of federal practice, it was
improper for the Court to preempt the statute on its own.
This Article examines the "one-voice" myth in U.S. foreign relations
and its application by the Crosby Court. Part I discusses the reasoning in
Crosby and the Court's reliance on the "one-voice" doctrine. Part II reviews
the history of the "one-voice" doctrine and argues that neither the consti-
tutional text nor U.S. history supports the principle of a solitary (execu-
* Professor, University of Texas School of Law; A.B. 1987, Brown University;
M.St. 1989, Oxford University; J.D. 1992, Yale Law School. I am grateful for the
advice and comments of Douglas Laycock, Sanford Levinson, Peter Spiro, Edward
Tuddenham and Ernest Young, as well as the insights of the participants in a
faculty colloquium on Crosby at the University of Texas School of Law, including
Patricia Hansen and Louise Weinberg. I also appreciate the library support of
Jonathan Pratter, the research assistance of Suzan Kern and the editorial assistance
of the Villanova Law Review.
1. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
2. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381.
(975)
VILIANOVA LAW REVIEW
tive) voice in U.S. foreign relations. Part III examines contemporary U.S.
practice regarding federalism and U.S. foreign relations, and contends
that the United States has not only tolerated, but actively encouraged, in-
dependent state activities such as the Massachusetts Burma Law. The na-
tional government has done so both by preserving sub-national
responsibility and autonomy in its treaty ratifications, and by declining to
employ numerous political instruments available to both Congress and the
executive to override state measures that diverge from national policy.
The Article concludes that incorporation of the "one-voice" doctrine into
the Court's implied statutory preemption analysis contravened the federal
government's longstanding deference to the states in this area. The
Court's reliance on the "one-voice" myth to strike down the Massachusetts
statute merely allowed the Court to evade more searching inquiry into the
legitimate state interests served by the Massachusetts procurement law and
the proper balance of federal-state relations in this area. Indeed, under
the most extreme interpretation of Crosby, the proposition that the nation
should speak with one voice in foreign relations could be used to justify
invalidating any state law that impacted U.S. foreign relations, however
incidentally, regardless of the presence of a federal statute. If Crosby leads
to a general practice of judicial invalidation of state and local measures
that affect foreign affairs, at the behest of private litigants, regardless of
the actions of the national political branches, it will reverse two centuries
of constitutional practice and significantly reallocate power over foreign
affairs.
I. THE CROSBY DECISION
The government.procurement statute at issue in Crosby barred state
entities from contracting with businesses that did business in Burma.3 The
statute was adopted to prevent Massachusetts taxpayer dollars from sup-
porting human rights violations committed by Burma's repressive military
regime. The Crosby plaintiffs contended that the statute violated the fed-
eral foreign commerce and foreign affairs powers or was impliedly pre-
empted by a federal law imposing sanctions on Burma.4 Massachusetts
argued in defense that the provision did not unduly conflict with federal
law and involved legitimate exercise of core state speech and spending
rights.5 The United States appeared, as amicus, urging the law's
illegality. 6
3. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, § 22 (H) (a), UJ) (a) (West 2000) ("A state
agency, a state authority, the house of representatives or the state senate may not
procure goods or services from, .. any persons currently doing business in Burma
(Myanmar).").
4. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 371-72 (stating plaintiffs' position).
5. See id. at 379-80 (addressing state's arguments).
6. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Natsios v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 2000 WL 35838 (1st Cir. Feb. 14, 2000) (No. 99-474).
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Both lower courts invalidated the Massachusetts law. The district
court struck down the law under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine of
Zschernig v. Miller,7 holding that the law had more than "some incidental
or indirect effect in foreign countries" or a "great potential for disruption
or embarrassment" of United States foreign policy.8 The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit invalidated the provision on all three
grounds asserted by the plaintiffs.9 The court rejected Massachusetts' con-
tention that the law fell within the state's local spending interests as a mar-
ket participant and concluded that Massachusetts had no legitimate
interest in expressing "moral concerns" regarding human rights condi-
tions in a foreign state.10 The First Circuit went so far as to contend that
the enumerated powers doctrine, which might otherwise have reserved
room for state activity regarding its own spending policies, did not apply in
the foreign affairs area.'I
The United States Supreme Court affirmed without addressing the
Foreign Commerce Clause and foreign affairs issues, holding simply that
the Massachusetts law was preempted sub silentio by the federal law. The
Federal Burma Statute, which was adopted three months after the Massa-
chusetts Burma Law, imposes a variety of mandatory sanctions against
Burma for human rights violations.' 2 The Act prohibits foreign aid to
Burma (other than humanitarian and anti-drug trafficking assistance), de-
nies U.S. entry visas to Burmese officials and directs the U.S. to oppose
financial assistance to Burma in international financial institutions such as
the World Bank. 13
In addition to these mandatory provisions, the Act directs the Presi-
dent to take a number of actions with respect to Burma. The President is
authorized to bar new investment in Burma by U.S. nationals if he finds
that Burma has acted against the democracy movement leader, Aung San
Suu Kyi, or has committed "large-scale repression" or violence against the
democratic opposition.14 The statute instructs the President to develop "a
comprehensive multilateral strategy" to improve the human rights situa-
7. 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968) (striking down state anti-communism law as
conflicting with federal foreign affairs powers). See discussion infra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text.
8. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass.
1998).
9. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1999),
affd sub nom., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
10. See id. at 70-71 (noting that Supreme Court has not recognized moral con-
cerns regarding international human rights as traditional areas of state concern).
11. See id. at 50 ("The broad statement that the federal government can exer-
cise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution .... is
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs.") (quoting United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936))).
12. See 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 570, 110 Stat. 3009-3166 (1996) [hereinafter Federal Burma Statute].
13. See id. § 570(a) (describing mandatory sanctions).
14. See id. § 570(b).
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tion and bring democracy to Burma. 15 Finally, the President may termi-
nate or waive any sanctions imposed under the statute upon finding that
such action is in U.S. national security interests 16 or that Burma has made
progress toward human rights and democracy. 17 In 1997, President Clin-
ton exercised his authority under the Federal Burma Statute and the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)1 8 to prohibit new
investment in Burma by U.S. persons and directed the Secretary of State to
work with U.S. allies to develop a strategy for promoting democracy and
human rights in Burma.19
Neither the Federal Burma Statute nor President Clinton's executive
order authorized sanctions on private trade in goods and services with
Burma. The federal provisions also did not address the validity of state
procurement policies. In particular, although the federal statute was
adopted three months after the Massachusetts Burma Law, neither the
federal statute nor the executive order mentioned the state law or pur-
ported to invalidate it. The Supreme Court thus was unable to rely on
express preemption in striking down the state law. Instead, the Court in-
ferred preemption from the statutory scheme, finding that the Massachu-
setts law improperly compromised the President's capacity "to speak for
the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments." 20
The Court held that the Massachusetts law violated the "one-voice"
principle and contradicted the federal policy toward Burma in three re-
spects. First, the Court found that the statute intruded on the delegation
of power and diplomatic authority to the President to control Burma pol-
icy. In enacting the federal statute, the Court stated, "Congress clearly
intended ... to provide the President with flexible and effective authority
over economic sanctions against Burma. '2 1 The "unyielding application"
of the Massachusetts law "undermine[d] the President's intended statu-
tory authority by making it impossible for him to restrain fully the coercive
power of the national economy .... 22 "It is simply implausible," the
Court reasoned, "that Congress would have gone to such lengths to em-
15. See id. § 570(c).
16. See id. § 570(e).
17. See id. § 570(a).
18. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706
(2000) [hereinafter IEEPA]. Under the JEEPA, if the President determines that
"any unusual and extraordinary threat [exists] . . . to the [U.S.] national security,
foreign policy, or economy," the President may declare a national emergency
under the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2000). The IEEPA
authorizes the President to impose broad economic sanctions, including restrict-
ing currency and freezing foreign assets. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702(a) (describ-
ing President's authority and explaining situations in which authority may be
utilized).
19. See Exec. Order No. 13,047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1998), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (2000).
20. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000).
21. Id. at 374.
22. Id. at 377.
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power the President if it had been willing to compromise his effectiveness
by deference to every provision of state statute or local ordinance that
might, if enforced, blunt the consequences of discretionary Presidential
action."23
Second, the Court found that the state law conflicted with federal pol-
icy by applying both to contracts for goods and services and to non-U.S.
persons.2 4 In imposing sanctions on foreign entities that would not be
sanctioned under the federal law, the state law interfered with the national
government's decision "about the right degree of [sanctions] pressure to
employ."25 "Sanctions are drawn not only to bar what they prohibit but to
allow what they permit," the Court reasoned, "and the inconsistency of
sanctions here undermines the congressional calibration of force."26
Finally, the Court found that the state law compromised the Presi-
dent's authority by limiting his ability to speak for the United States in the
international community in its development of a "comprehensive, multi-
lateral strategy" for reform in Burma.27 Congress' "clear mandate," the
Court concluded, "belies any suggestion that Congress intended the Presi-
dent's effective voice to be obscured by state or local action."28
In relying on the proposition that the United States must speak with
one voice, through the President, to invalidate the Massachusetts procure-
ment law, the Court invoked a familiar mantra of U.S. foreign relations
jurisprudence. The "one-voice" doctrine has been applied frequently by
the courts to strike down state activities implicating foreign relations. The
doctrine itself, however, finds little support in the constitutional frame-
work and provides little guidance for discerning which state activities im-
properly infringe on U.S. foreign policy. As discussed in the following
section, although the "one-voice" doctrine has lengthy roots in the case
law, the Constitution ensures that the national government will speak at
least as a trio in the foreign relations area. And as a matter of historical
practice, if not text, states frequently take actions that impact foreign rela-
tions and that may even provoke international protest, through the exer-
cise of core state spending, communicative, and regulatory authority.
II. THE "ONE-VOICE" MYrH IN U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
A. Judicial Origins of the "One-Voice" Doctrine
The principle that authority over foreign relations vests exclusively in
the national government, to the exclusion of the states, has strong consti-
23. Id. at 376.
24. See id. at 378.
25, Id. at 380.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 381.
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tutional roots, 29 and early judicial decisions bolstered the states' exclusion
from foreign relations. In Brown v. Maryland,3 0 Chief Justice Marshall
struck down a state import-licensing requirement as violating federal ex-
clusivity over foreign commerce, noting that state activity in this area could
provoke conflict with foreign governments. 3 1 In 1832, while invalidating
Georgia's efforts to regulate Indian affairs (which were then considered
part of U.S. foreign relations), the Marshall Court emphasized that the
Constitution gave this authority exclusively to the national government. 32
In the latter 1800s, state efforts to regulate immigration were invalidated
on similar grounds.33 In Chy Lung v. Freeman,3 4 for example, the Supreme
Court struck down a California immigration regulation as infringing on
the exclusive national power over foreign commerce. The Court empha-
sized the ability of state policies to create international conflict:
[I]f this plaintiff and her twenty companions had been subjects
of the Queen of Great Britain, can any one doubt that this matter
would have been the subject of international inquiry, if not of a
direct claim for redress? Upon whom would such a claim be
made? Not upon the State of California; for, by our Constitution,
she can hold no exterior relations with other nations. It would
be made upon the government of the United States. If that gov-
ernment should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or
to suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all
the Union?3 5
The state policy, the Court found, could "embroil us in disastrous quarrels
with other nations."31 6
29. For a discussion of the constitutional basis, see infra notes 111-17 and ac-
companying text.
30. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
31. Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 447 ("What answer would the United States
give to the [foreign] complaints and just reproaches to which such an extraordi-
nary circumstance would expose them? No apology could be received, or even
offered.").
32. See Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) ("The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and
laws, vested in the government of the United States.").
33. See New York v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 60, 63
(1883) (invalidating state immigration restrictions as violating exclusive national
power over foreign commerce); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280-81 (1875)
(same); Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270-75 (1875) (same).
34. 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
35. Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279.
36. Id. at 280.
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The trilogy of decisions in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,- 7
United States v. Belmon 8 and United States v. Pink,39 solidified the states'
exclusion from foreign relations and elevated the President to the position
of national spokesperson. That the United States should speak with one
voice through the President, as the "sole organ" of the United States in
foreign relations, was the animating principle (albeit dicta) behind the
Court's landmark 1936 decision in Curtiss-Wright.40 Writing for the Court,
Justice Sutherland argued that states had never enjoyed any aspect of the
nation's "external powers," which lay exclusively in the national govern-
ment.4 1 Courts have repeatedly cited Curtiss-Wright for the proposition
that the President is the preeminent instrument of U.S. foreign policy.
4 2
In particular, the position that the United States must speak with a unified
message has been invoked repeatedly to exclude states from activities that
might infringe on U.S. foreign relations.
Building on the precedent in Curtiss-Wright, Pink and Belmont upheld
the power of a sole executive agreement to trump a New York banking
statute. In both cases, the Supreme Court emphasized that "[p]ower over
external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national gov-
ernment exclusively." 43 Indeed, the Court asserted, "in respect of our for-
eign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the
State . . . does not exist."44
The apex of the Court's "one-voice" jurisprudence likely is the deci-
sion in Zschernig, the only case in which the Supreme Court has applied
the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs preemption. 45 Zschernig invali-
37. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding federal law delegating foreign affairs au-
thority to President).
38. 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (holding that state banking policy cannot override
executive agreement recognizing Soviet Union).
39. 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (holding that state banking policy cannot conflict
with international agreement).
40. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (recognizing exclusive power of "Presi-
dent as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations").
41. Id. at 316; see also id. at 306 (same). For a critique and analysis of Justice
Sutherland's history, see Charles A. Lofgren, The Foreign Relations Power: United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, in GOVERN-
MENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE 167-205 (1986). See also Louis HENKIN, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 329-31 n.10 (2d ed. 1996) (critiquing justice
Sutherland's analysis).
42. For critiques of this position, see, for example, HAROLD H. Ko-I, THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 94 (1990) ("Curtiss-Wright painted a dramatically
different vision of the National Security Constitution from that which [had] pre-
vailed since the founding of the Republic.").
43. Pink, 315 U.S. at 233; see also Belmont, 301 U.S. at 334 ("Plainly, the exter-
nal powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or
policies").
44. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
45. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). For an analysis and critique
of the doctrine, see Curtis Bradley &Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
2001]
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dated an Oregon statute barring inheritance by nationals of communist
states that denied inheritance rights to U.S. citizens. The Court so ruled
despite the facts that the Oregon law did not conflict with any federal
provision, and the U.S. Department of Justice had represented as amicus
that the Oregon statute did not "unduly interfere[ ] with the United
States' conduct of foreign relations."4 6 The Court held that the Oregon
statute nevertheless constituted "an intrusion by the State into the field of
foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and Con-
gress."4 7 The resulting doctrine of foreign affairs preemption, which was
clearly a product of Cold War tensions, suggested that any state or local
government action with more than "some incidental or indirect effect in
foreign countries" 48 was per se invalid under the constitutional distribution
of the foreign affairs powers, whether or not the action actually conflicted
with national policy.
Thus, the requirement of a unified voice in foreign relations has
emerged from two related lines of doctrine: the principle that states are
excluded from international relations, and the assumption that the Presi-
dent speaks as a soloist for the United States.
The Supreme Court first expressly adopted the "one-voice" principle
as an element of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis.49 In the
commercial arena, where Congress has not expressly preempted state ac-
tivities, courts have employed the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause to
prevent state commercial activities from unduly burdening the "special
need for federal uniformity" in international economic policies. 50 The
underlying assumption of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis is
that congressional inertia and other legislative demands will prevent Con-
gress from anticipating and invalidating every state measure that burdens
foreign commerce. "The practical result is that in default of action by [the
courts, the States] will go on suffocating and retarding and Balkanizing
American commerce, trade and industry."5 '
Accordingly, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,5 2 the Court
held that California's ad valorem property tax violated the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause by impeding the Government's ability to "'spea[k] with
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 861-67
(1997).
46. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434 (quoting U.S. position).
47. Id. at 432.
48. Id. at 434-35.
49. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451
(1979) (stating that dormant Commerce Clause requires consideration of addi-
tional factor of whether law "prevents the Federal Government from 'speaking
with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments'"
(quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976))).
50. See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
51. Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
52. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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one voice"' in foreign affairs. 53 The holding was motivated by the Court's
finding that "[t] he risk of retaliation by Japan ... [was] acute, and such
retaliation of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole."54 Simi-
larly, in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,55 the Court held
that Alaskan regulations governing the processing of state-owned timber
for export violated the "one-voice" standard. 56
Despite the anti-state orientation of cases such as Belmont, Pink,
Zschernig and Japan Line, the courts have tolerated some state activity that
impinges on foreign relations. In Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Depart-
ment of Revenue,57 for example, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
Florida's tax on the sale of aviation fuel despite the United States' asser-
tion, as amicus, that the tax "threaten[ed] the ability of the Federal Gov-
ernment to 'speak with one voice."' 58 The Court found that international
agreements regulating such taxation did not apply to the individual states,
and noted that "we [have] never suggested . . . that the Foreign Com-
merce Clause insists that the Federal Government speak with any particu-
lar voice."'59 In Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston,6°1 the Court
likewise held that Tennessee's tax on shipping containers did not violate
the "one-voice" standard. 6 1 The Court noted that U.S. treaties and other
laws exempted state taxes from regulation, that the Executive defended
the statute and that congressional actions suggested the state tax could be
tolerated.6 2 Most recently, in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Board 3 and Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board,64 the Supreme Court
held that California's worldwide combined reporting requirement for tax-
ation of corporations with foreign operations did not violate the "one-
voice" standard. 65
Wardair, Container Corp. and Barclays Bank all rejected the suggestion
that a clear statement or "specific indication[ ] of congressional intent"
was required to allow a state practice under the dormant Foreign Com-
53. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452-53.
54. Id. at 453.
55. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
56. See Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 100 ("It is crucial to the efficient execution of the
Nation's foreign policy that 'the Federal Government . . . speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments."').
57. 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
58. See Wardair Canada, 477 U.S. at 9.
59. See id. at 13 (clarifying decision in Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County,
441 U.S. 434 (1979)).
60. 507 U.S. 60 (1993).
61. See Itel, 507 U.S. at 75-76 ("[T]ennessee's tax does not infringe the Gov-
ernment's ability to speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations
with other nations.").
62. See id.
63. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
64. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
65. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 320-28; Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 193-97.
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merce Clause. 6 6 In Barclays Bank, the Supreme Court looked to the ac-
tions of Congress and the Executive in deciding whether a state activity
improperly conflicted with national policy. Despite strenuous objection by
the United States' major trading partners, the Court concluded that by
failing to prohibit California's taxation system explicitly, Congress had
"passively indicat[ed] that certain state practices do not 'impair federal
uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential."' 6 7 In other
words, the Court reasoned that Congress "need not convey [its] intent
with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that dis-
criminates against interstate commerce .... 68
In short, the "one-voice" principle has been applied by the Court to
strike down state activities with relatively little de facto impact on U.S. for-
eign relations (Zschernig), while the Court has declined to find the doc-
trine violated where state conduct has provoked substantial international
outcry (Barclays Bank). The doctrine itself yields few criteria for meaning-
fully distinguishing conduct by states that can, or cannot, be tolerated in
the foreign affairs arena. The decision in Crosby has now expanded this
tradition by applying the "one-voice" doctrine to the statutory preemption
context.
B. The National Foreign Relations Powers
Despite its relatively frequent use by the courts, the "one-voice" doc-
trine has little support in the constitutional text, U.S. history or practice.
Turning first to the Constitution itself, it is clear that the Framers guaran-
teed, as a matter of constitutional design, that the United States would not
"speak with one voice" in foreign relations. The foreign affairs powers are
carefully divided among the three branches of the national government,
with Article I of the Constitution bestowing the bulk of the foreign affairs
powers on Congress. 69 Thus, Article I, section 8 gives Congress the powers
to provide for the common defense, to regulate foreign commerce, to es-
tablish a uniform rule of naturalization, to regulate foreign coin and to
define and punish crimes on the high seas and against the law of na-
tions. 70 Congress further is authorized to prohibit the migration and im-
portation of persons-that peculiar form of foreign commerce-after
66. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 324; Wardair Canada Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Reve-
nue, 477 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (noting that "rather than prohibit state regulation in the
area, Congress invited it.); Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 195-97 (discussing federal
tolerance of state policy).
67. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)).
68. See id. (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986)).
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
70. See id. § 8.
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1808,71 and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying out those
powers.72
Article II of the United States Constitution authorizes the President to
receive ambassadors 73 and endows the President with the executive
power.74 Important foreign relations powers such as the treaty, diplomatic
and war powers are shared between Congress and the Executive. Thus,
Article II authorizes the President to enter into treaties and appoint am-
bassadors with the advice and consent of the Senate. 75 The President is
designated the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, 76 while the war
powers of Congress include the authority to declare war; to grant letters of
marque and reprisal; to make rules concerning captures on land and
water; to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to
make rules for the land and naval forces; to repel invasions; and to organ-
ize, arm and discipline the militia.77 Congressional authority over the
purse 78 gives Congress additional power to second-guess the decisions of
the Executive in this and other areas.
Article III of the Constitution gives the federal judiciary a role in for-
eign relations. The courts are authorized to hear all cases arising under
the laws and treaties of the United States, including cases involving admi-
ralty or maritime jurisdiction and controversies in which foreign states,
citizens or subjects are a party.79 The Supreme Court possesses original
jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors and consuls.80
This structural division of authority has yielded a number of memora-
ble conflicts. The Senate may refuse to consent to international agree-
ments that the President has negotiated and signed,8' as in the infamous
case of the Versailles Treaty.82 This tension has manifested itself more
recently with the Senate's refusal to ratify many human rights treaties.
The Genocide Convention,8" for example, was signed and introduced to
the Senate by President Truman in 1949. The treaty languished for nearly
71. See id. § 9, cl. 1.
72. See id. § 8, cl. 18.
73. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
74. See id. § 1, cl. 1.
75. See id. § 2, cl. 2.
76. See id. § 2, cl. 1.
77. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
78. See id. § 9, cl. 7.
79. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
80. See id. § 2, cl. 2.
81. "A treaty entering the Senate," Secretary of State John Hay wrote, "is like a
bull going into the arena; no one can say just how or when the final blow will fall-
but one thing is certain, it will never leave the arena alive." QuINcY WRIGHT, THE
CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 360 (1922) (quoting 2 WILLAIM ROSCOE
THAYER, THE LIFE OF JOHN HAY 393 (1915)).
82. See, e.g., GEORGE SCOTr, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 38-
50 (1973) (discussing Senate opposition to Versailles Treaty).
83. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 UN.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
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four decades, despite renewed requests for ratification by the Nixon and
Carter Administrations, before the Senate finally gave its consent in
1988.84 The Senate similarly declined to ratify conventions relating to
forced labor and women's rights that were introduced by the Kennedy
Administration. 8 5 The Torture Convention,8 6 the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 8 7 and the Race Discrimination Con-
vention 88 were all introduced to the Senate by the Carter Administration,
but Senate consent to these instruments was not forthcoming until the
1990s.89 The Senate has rendered the United States anomalous in the
world community by continuing to withhold consent to the Convention to
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 9° and the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child.9 1 The Senate also has declined to consent
to the American Convention on Human Rights. 92 Although President
Clinton signed the treaty creating a Permanent International Criminal
Court, Senator Jesse Helms, then-Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, announced that the treaty would be "dead on arrival" in the
84. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost
of SenatorBricker, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 341, 347 (1995) (discussing history of Genocide
Convention).
85. See 113 CONG. REC. 8364, 8364 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1967) (noting Senate's
rejection of conventions involving labor and women's rights).
86. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force
June 26, 1987).
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
88. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
89. For example, President Carter signed the ICCPR for the United States on
October 5, 1977. See THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAELJ. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS AND NATIONAL SECURrFY LAw 317 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that ICCPR was con-
sented to by United States Senate on April 2, 1992).
90. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). The
Convention has been ratified by 168 nations, not including the United States. This
and other treaty ratification information is available on the United Nations Treaty
Collection, the Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary Gen-
eral, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/
chapterIV/treaty9.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2001) [hereinafter UN Treaty
Collection]
91. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). The Convention has been ratified by every state
except the United States and Somalia, which has no working government. See UN
Treaty Collection, supra note 90, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/en-
glishinternetbible/partl/chapterIV/treatyl 5.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
92. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
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Senate. 93 Opponents to the court have introduced legislation that would
bar the United States from cooperating with the tribunal.
94
While the express shared responsibility over the treaty power makes
treaties particularly susceptible to conflict, disagreement between Con-
gress and the Executive is not limited to this area. Congress may adopt
legislation, with the President's signature, that is opposed by the Executive
and that exposes the United States to international controversy. Recent
examples include Congress' refusal to appropriate funds for United Na-
tions dues and Congress' imposition of restrictions on U.S. foreign assis-
tance for international family planning organizations. Congress also may
override an executive veto, as Congress did in imposing sanctions on
South Africa in 1986. 95
The Executive, in turn, may ignore the desires of Congress. President
George W. Bush and his three predecessors refused to honor Congress'
effort to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 96 Presidents
Clinton and George W. Bush both exercised waivers to avoid enforcing the
more extreme provisions of the so-called Helms-Burton Act,97 which au-
thorized U.S. nationals to sue foreign persons and companies that traf-
ficked in expropriated property in Cuba.98
Congress and the Executive recently clashed further over the ability
of U.S. nationals to pursue damages against foreign sovereigns in U.S.
courts. In 1996, Congress waived foreign sovereign immunity for certain
types of suits against foreign states deemed sponsors of terrorism, 9 9 and
Congress later adopted legislation that allowed successful litigants in such
cases to attach the U.S. assets of foreign states.100 Having signed the latter
legislation, President Clinton then acted to block its implementation, ar-
93. See Barbara Crossette, Time Is Short for U.S. to Join the International Criminal
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2000, at A9 (quoting Senator Helms).
94. See Barbara Crossette, Clinton Weighing Options on World Criminal Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at A5 (discussing legislative opposition to court).
95. See infra note 139.
96. SeeJerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, § 3(a)(3), 109 Stat.
398, 399 (1995); see also Bush Delays Move of U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, WASH. POST,
June 12, 2001, at A7 (explaining President's postponement of relocation of
embassy).
97. See Christopher Marquis, Bush Forgoes Trying to Bar Cuba Deals by Foreigners,
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2001, at A8 (discussing Bush's decision to continue suspen-
sion); David E. Sanger, Clinton Grants, Then Suspends, Right to Sue Foreigners on Cuba,
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1996, at Al (discussing Clinton's decision to suspend Title III
of Act). Exercise of the waivers appear to violate Congress' purpose. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 65-66 (1996) (stating view that President could not in
good faith find waiver requirements satisfied under current conditions in Cuba).
98. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-114, § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. 785, 815 (1996).
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000) (waiving foreign sovereign immunity
for injury or death resulting from torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage or
hostage taking).
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (7), (f)(1)(A).
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guing that it would endanger U.S. security interests.'0 But in 2000, Con-
gress adopted legislation allowing such judgments to be paid. 102
The war powers also have been an area of conflict between Congress
and the Executive, with Congress lending ambivalent support to recent
military conflicts. 11 3 The War Powers Resolution, 104 which was adopted by
Congress over President Nixon's veto in order to constrain executive war-
making, has been implicitly rejected by every succeeding President and
was violated by President Clinton in the Kosovo conflict. 10 5 Congress and
the Executive pursued overtly conflicting military policies toward the Nica-
raguan contras in the 1980s, ultimately causing a federal court to conclude
that while the U.S. Congress was at peace with Nicaragua, the U.S. Execu-
tive had been at war. 106
Finally, federal courts, in exercising their legitimate constitutional au-
thority, may disrupt U.S. foreign relations policies in a variety of ways.
Courts may refuse extradition requests made by the federal government'l 7
101. See Presidential Determination No. 2001-03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66483 (Oct. 28,
2000) (waiving, on national security grounds, provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1)
authorizing attachment of property of terrorist states for execution ofjudgments);
Presidential Determination No. 99-1, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,201 (Oct. 21, 1998) (waiving
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1606).
102. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-386, § 2002(a) (1) (B), 114 Stat. 1464 (authorizing victims of terrorist acts
by certain foreign states to collect compensatory damages in exchange for relin-
quishing right to punitive damages and to attach domestic assets of foreign state);
see also Christopher Marquis, Families Win Cuban Money in Pilots' Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2001, at A18 (noting that Treasury Department had authorized release of
$96.7 million in Cuban assets to pay compensatory and punitive damages to fami-
lies of three pilots shot down by Cuba in 1996).
103. See Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 1999) (dismissing
suit by members of Congress to declare U.S. airstrikes against Kosovo unlawful);
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1143 (D.D.C. 1990) (dismissing suit brought
by members of Congress to prevent President Bush from going to war with Iraq);
JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 47-67 (1993) (arguing for greater judicial
and congressional involvement in war powers).
104. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1994).
105. See generally Gerald G. Howard, Combat in Kosovo: Ignoring the War Powers
Resolution, 38 Hous. L. REV. 261 (2001) (arguing that Kosovo bombing campaign
violated War Powers Resolution); Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final
Destruction of the War Powers Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149 (2001) (same).
But see Abraham D. Sofaer, The War Powers Resolution and Kosovo, 34 Lov. L.A. L.
REV. 71, 75 (2000) ("In the real world of legal responsibility, the measures adopted
by Congress [with respect to Kosovo campaign] clearly established its approval.").
106. See United States v. Terrell, 731 F. Supp. 473, 476-77 (1989) ("[B]y no
stretch of the imagination can the United States be said to have been 'at peace'
with Nicaragua .... [A]lthough Congress may have abstained from supporting
the Contras for ten months, the executive branch did not abstain.").
107. In 1997, a federal magistrate refused to authorize the transfer to the In-
ternational Criminal Court for Rwanda of a Rwandan indicted for genocide, find-
ing that the transfer would be unconstitutional, and released the suspect. He was
rearrested in 1998 and ordered surrendered to the Tribunal. See Ntakirutimana v.
Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming transfer to Rwandan Tribunal);
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and allow politically sensitive suits to proceed against ,foreign states."18
Courts also may disrupt international affairs by reviewing the legality of
foreign relations actions of the political branches, 10 9 and by rejecting the
executive's interpretation of national security matters. I 10
Thus, on the national level, a trio of voices contributes to making U.S.
foreign policy. And while those voices often speak in harmony, their inde-
pendent authority creates real and constitutionally-intended potential for
a-tonal and discordant policy results. On the federal level, at least, the
proposition that the United States will speak with one voice in foreign
relations is unsupported as a matter of both constitutional text and histori-
cal practice.
C. The States and Foreign Relations
The question posed by Crosby and by the broader question of federal-
ism in U.S. foreign relations, however, is not whether the national govern-
ment must speak with one voice (to which the answer must be no), but
whether and to what extent state voices also may impact U.S. foreign rela-
tions. One could plausibly argue that while three national voices may be
intentionally tolerated in foreign affairs, a chorus of fifty sub-national.
voices (or indeed, several thousand, if counties and municipalities are in-
cluded) is too much. As discussed below, while the Constitution largely
excludes states from participating in foreign relations, historic and con-
temporary practice has left some play for state action in this area.
see also Barbara Crossette, Rwandan in Genocide Case Makes Last Appeal to Stay in U.S.,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 1999, at A10 (discussing case).
108. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 34 (D.D.C.
1998) (awarding $226 million in damages against government of Iran for state
sponsorship of terrorist attack). As part of diplomatic overtures to Iran following
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the executive branch inter-
vened in a suit brought against Iran by fifty-two Americans held hostage in 1979.
The government unsuccessfully sought to bar damages testimony by the plaintiffs
and moved to dismiss the case. For further discussion, see Elaine Sciolino & Neil
Lewis, Iran Dances a 'Ballet' with U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at BI (discussing
U.S. intervention in suit as part of renewed diplomatic efforts with Iran); News in
Brief, HERALD SUN (DURHAM, N.C.), Oct. 16, 2001, at A2 (discussing court's rejec-
tion of government effort to bar testimony).
109. For example, actions by a federal court recently threatened to unravel a
settlement agreement between Germany and the United States to compensate Hol-
ocaust victims, when the court refused to dismiss the victims' legal claims until
funds for the settlement agreement were secured. See Edmund L. Andrews, New
Legal Disputes Put Holocaust Victim Payments in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2001, at A3
(discussing German reaction to court ruling).
110. See generally, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (rejecting President's claim that national security required suppression of
publication of Department of Defense papers regarding Vietnam War); Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (rejecting President's claim
that Korean War warranted executive seizure of steel mills).
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1. The Constitutional Text
Aside from the manageability problems posed by such a potential
cacophony, the Constitution largely precludes states and localities from
participating in foreign affairs. It is well established that the framers
sought to give the national government authority to bind the states to U.S.
foreign relations decisions, including U.S. treaty obligations. As Madison
famously proclaimed in Federalist No. 42, " [i] f we are to be one nation in
any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations."' I The
conduct of the states during the pre-constitutional era1 12 underscored the
concern, as Edmund Randolph articulated, that "if a state acts against a
foreign government contrary to the laws of nations or violates a treaty, the
national government cannot punish that State or compel its
obedience ...
The Framers accordingly empowered the national government to si-
lence the states in foreign relations where silence was deemed necessary.
Article I, section 10 of the Constitution prohibits the states from entering
into treaties or alliances or granting letters of marque and reprisal. 114
This section further requires congressional consent before states may tax
imports and exports, keep troops or warships in time of peace, enter into
agreements or compacts with foreign states or engage in war (unless in-
vaded). 1 15 The Supremacy Clause likewise establishes that federal statutes
and treaties trump state law and obligates state judges to respect federal
law.' 16 Commentators dispute whether the Article I, section 10 prohibi-
tions establish that the states enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over foreign
relations powers not prohibited to the states in that clause.' 17 But the
111. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 279 Uames Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
112. As is well documented, states created international tensions for the new
government by imposing embargoes, by ignoring customary international law
norms and by flouting treaty obligations. See Michael Ramsey, The Myth of Extracon-
stitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 419-24 (2000) (discuss-
ing state practices under the Articles of Confederation). See generally FREDERICK W.
MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CON-
STITUTION (1986) (exploring impact of state foreign affairs activities on the new
Constitution).
113. A Letter of His Excellency Edmund Randolph, Esquire, on the Federal
Constitution (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 86, 88 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981); see also 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (Madison's Notes, May 29, 1787) ("[T]he federal
government could not check the quarrals between states, nor a rebellion in any
not having constitutional power Nor means to interpose according to the
exigency").
114. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
115. Id.
116. See U.S. CONSr. art. VI, cl. 2.
117. Compare Jack Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83
VA. L. REV. 1617, 1642 (1997) ("The most natural inference from these provisions
and from the Constitution's enumerated powers structure is that all foreign rela-
tions matters not excluded by Article I, Section 10 fall within the concurrent power
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power of the federal government under the Constitution to control the
foreign relations actions of the states is well established.
2. Historical Practice
Despite the apparent clarity of the constitutional text, actual relations
between the states and the national government over foreign relations
have been significantly more nuanced, and the boundaries of state author-
ity in this area remain unclear. The Tenth Amendment carves out a zone
(albeit undefined) of traditional state authority, 1 18 and certain foreign re-
lations powers, such as the foreign commerce power, allow for some state
activity where Congress has not prohibited it. From the beginning of the
Republic, traditional state interests have presented a potential for conflict
with both foreign nations and U.S. foreign policy. U.S. history has been
characterized both by substantial actions by states that affect foreign affairs
and by deference and tolerance of many such state actions by the national
political branches. Thus, determining the extent to which legitimate state
activities may impinge on foreign affairs remains difficult.
Numerous powers that are viewed as traditional areas of state author-
ity have the potential to impact foreign relations. State authority over
aliens historically has been a persistent source of international conflict.,' 9
For example, when applied to aliens, local rules regarding land owner-
ship, inheritance and occupational licenses may conflict with U.S. treaty
of the state and federal governments until preempted by federal statute or treaty"),
with Peter Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (1999)
("The constitutional architecture itself evinces a norm of federal exclusivity in for-
eign affairs, on the one hand granting expansive foreign relations power to the
federal government, on the other denying them to the states.").
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
119. During the antebellum period, coastal Southern states' Negro Seamen
Acts, which provided for the detention of free black sailors, were "a persistent dip-
lomatic embarrassment" to the United States and provoked direct diplomatic over-
tures between Great Britain and the Southern states. See GERALD NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW
39 (1996); see also Spiro, supra note 117, at 1235-36 (discussing views that the
seamen acts were unconstitutional). New York's prosecution of British subject Al-
exander McLeod in 1841, despite British assertions of diplomatic immunity, led to
the adoption of legislation establishing federal jurisdiction over similar state prose-
cutions. 1 CHARLES H. BUTLER, THE TREATY MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
142-149 (1902) (discussing the McLeod incident). At the turn of the last century, a
San Francisco ordinance segregating Japanese school children and California laws
barringJapanese from owning property provoked diplomatic protests that the leg-
islation violated treaties with Japan. See WRIGHT, supra note 81, at 30, 265. The
lynching of Italian nationals in Louisiana in 1891 and in Mississippi in 1901 also
provoked diplomatic protests by Italy against the United States. 6JOHN B. MOORE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 837-41 (1906) (discussing Louisiana incident); 1
BUTLER, supra, at 153-59 (same); WRIGHT, supra note 81, at 206 (discussing Missis-
sippi incident). For further discussion of state anti-alien activities circa 1900 and
the U.S. response, see Spiro, supra note 117, at 1237-39.
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obligations or provoke objection from foreign states. 12" State interests in
family law conflicted with federal immigration authority in the Elian Gon-
zalez case. 12 1 States such as Texas that border on foreign countries may
generate conflicts over land and water rights and a wide range of other
local measures.' 22 State control of natural resources may become a for-
eign relations issue when regulated by treaty.'12  Like the anti-communism
statute that was struck down in Zschernig, Florida in 1963 adopted a Terri-
torial Waters Act, which denied vessels and nationals from communist
states licenses to fish in Florida waters, absent a formal indication by the
State Department that the individual or vessel was from a friendly state. 1
24
120. See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 343 (1924) (invalidating,
under U.S. treaty, municipal law barring aliens from trade licenses); Blythe v.
Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 34041 (1901) (finding that in absence of treaty, right of
state to declare alien capable of taking and holding property is not precluded by
Compact Clause); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1890) (finding that U.S.
treaty overrides state laws prohibiting alien inheritance of property); Hauenstein v.
Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1880) (same); Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. (2
Wheat.) 259, 271 (1817) (same); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816) (addressing impact of treaty on alien land rights).
121. See In re Gonzalez, No. 00-00479-FC-28, 2000 WL 492102, at *4 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Apr. 13, 2000). The Florida court made clear that federal immigration author-
ity overrode any conflicting provisions of state law.
122. For example, during the 77th Regular Session (2001) of the Texas Legis-
lature, one state senator from El Paso had the following bills on his legislative
agenda: SB 224, requiring that the Texas Transportation Commission meet with
officials of bordering Mexican states to discuss transportation and infrastructure;
SB 733, proposing that junior colleges in counties bordering Mexico grant in-state
tuition to needy Mexican students; SB 749, authorizing the Texas Natural Re-
source Conservation Commission to contribute human and financial resources to
environmental projects in Mexico; and SCR 5, urging the U.S. Congress to amend
federal law so representatives from Mexico may sit on policy committees of metro-
politan planning organizations along the border. For text, analysis and bill histo-
ries, see The Texas Senate, Bills Authored by Eliot Shapleigh, at http://
www.capitol.state.tx. us/cgi-bin/db2www/senate/m brbills.d2w/re-
port?LEG=77&SESS=R&LEGCODE=A1540&TYPE=A (last visited Oct. 18, 2001).
123. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (federal legislation protect-
ing migratory birds enacted pursuant to treaty overrides reserved state powers).
124. See 1963 Fla. Laws ch. 63-202, at 457, as amended, Fi-A. STAT. ANN.
§ 370.21(3) (West 1994). A conviction under the statute apparently was upheld.
See Note on Florida v. Manuel Gomez Barios (Application of Florida Territorial Waters
Act to Cuban Fishermen), 3 I.L.M. 317, 317 (1964) (stating that masters of vessels
were found guilty of violating statute); see also HENKIN, supra note 41, at 437 n.66
(discussing Florida Territorial Waters Act).
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And, of course, states have communicative 125 and spending interests that
may impact foreign affairs.126
States also have been granted or allowed a role in implementing as-
pects of U.S. foreign policy. Under the Articles of Confederation, states
enjoyed power to punish offenses against the law of nations,' 27 and al-
though the Constitution grants this power to Congress, states retain au-
thority to pass supplemental legislation.' 2l  Since the early days of the
Republic, Congress has left enforcement of many laws implicating foreign
affairs to the states,' 29 and the United States has ratified treaties authoriz-
ing states to engage in direct extradition to foreign governments.130 State
courts also exercise jurisdiction over suits under treaties, those brought by
ambassadors or consuls, or suits brought against foreign governments that
are not barred by foreign sovereign immunity.' 3 '
125. As early examples, in the 1798 Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, states
infamously protested against federal policies relating to the undeclared war with
France. In the winter of 1814, New England states gathered in Hartford, Connecti-
cut to protest the policies of the national government in the War of 1812. The
Hartford Convention was mooted by the end of the war. See Donald Hickey, New
England' Defense Problem and the Genesis of the Hartford Convention, 50 NEw ENG. Q.
587 (1977) (discussing of Hartford Convention). See generally THEODORE DWIGHT,
HISTORY OF THE HARTFORD CONVENTION (1970). In 1897, Nebraska adopted a reso-
lution extending sympathy to Cuba; other states have adopted resolutions urging
recognition of foreign governments. See WRIGHT, supra note 81, at 265 n.5. For
further discussion of state communicative activities, see infra notes 196-97 and ac-
companying text. For other state activities impacting on foreign relations, see gen-
erally FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES (Brian Hocking ed., 1993); HAROLD
W. STOKE, THE FOREIGN REILATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATE (1931).
126. For further discussion of the ability of traditional state activities to im-
pinge on foreign relations, see Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, ConcurrentJurisdic-
tion, and the Foreign Affairs Exception 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 184 (2001)
(discussing potential negative consequences of state activities for foreign affairs).
But see Spiro, supra note 117, at 1226-27 (arguing that "making states accountable
to the international community... would likely further the incorporation of inter-
national laws in the United States").
127. See WRIGHT, supra note 81, at 177-78.
128. See Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 417 (1847) (discussing state au-
thority to pass criminal legislation enforcing law of nations); HENKIN, supra note
41, at 422-23 n.3 (same). California has adopted legislation allowing claims by
Holocaust victims to proceed in its courts. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 354.5 (Deer-
ing 2001).
129. See, e.g., Alien Enemies Act, ch. 58, § 2, 1 Stat. 577, 577-78 (1798) (au-
thorizing states to apprehend alien enemies); HENKIN, supra note 41, at 423 n.3
("Congress has from the beginning left enforcement of many national policies to
state officials and state courts.").
130. See, e.g., 1899 Treaty with Mexico, art. IX, 31 Stat. 1818, 1824-25 (1899)
(permitting states to directly extradite foreign nationals). But see United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414 (1886) (citing Holmes v.Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.)
540 (1840), with approval); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 573-74
(1840) (finding that Compact Clause prohibits state from extradicting on its own
authority).
131. For a discussion of state court decisions construing international law, see
generally Arthur Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20
YALEJ. INT'L L. 1 (1995).
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Congress formally has consented to only a handful of state agree-
ments with foreign governments under the Article I, section 10 Compact
Clause.13 2 But state and local governments have entered agreements with-
out congressional consent on local matters such as police cooperation,
border control and road construction.' 3 - Subnational governments en-
gage in a range of informal relations with foreign governments. In 1989,
for example, the Mayor of Irvine, California, and a California state senator
traveled to Vietnam to lobby (with some success) for the release of thirty
men whose families had fled Vietnam and resettled in California.' 3 4 May-
ors of larger U.S. cities often lead international missions to pursue eco-
nomic, social, cultural and other objectives. State and local governments
have opened trade offices and established sister-city relationships with for-
eign municipalities.1 3 5 A number of cities with sister-city arrangements
abroad, including Atlanta, Berkeley, Louisville, Milwaukee, St. Paul and
Wichita, have used their sister-community ties to pursue specific human
rights objectives, such as stopping the forced removal of black townships
in South Africa. I"' The legality of such state and local agreements is rarely
132. See HENKIN, supra note 41, at 153 (discussing congressionally-approved
state agreements regarding border rights).
133. See, e.g., Diana Washington Valdez, Deal May Have Real Substance, EL PASo
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2001, at B-3 (describing first-ever "International Statement of Co-
operation," to be signed by U.S. Congress member from El Paso and his Mexican
congressional counterpart, representing a commitment to work together on safety,
immigration, health and economic development issues); see also TEX. Gov'T. CODE
ANN. § 792.002 (Vernon 2001) ("A state agency or a political subdivision may, to
tic extent permitted under federal law, enter into an agreement with the United
Mexican States or a political subdivision; or an agency or entity that is created
under a treaty or executive agreement between the United States and the United
Mexican States."). Pursuant to this provision, on May 22, 1998, the Texas Depart-
ment of Protective and Regulatory Services signed an agreement with the Mexican
federal agency charged with human services, Desarrollo Integral de la Familia
(DIF). The agreement outlines standards whereby both agencies are to investigate
allegations of abuse and neglect of children and vulnerable adults who have ties in
both countries, make cross-border client placements, and bring witnesses across
the border to testify in abuse cases. Historic Agreement Spans Border To Help Victims of
Abuse and Neglect, PRS UPDATE (Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs.),July
1998, at 1, available at http://www.tdprs.state.tx.us/AboutPRS/
PRSReleases_&Newsletter/updatejul98.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2001); see also
HENKIN, supra note 41, at 153, 155, 426-27 n.26 (discussing state agreements with
foreign governments). For further discussion of the Compact Clause, see id. at
152, 423-26 nn.10-20.
134. For a discussion of lobbying efforts directed toward releasing Vietnamese
nationals, see Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Poli-
cies, 65 FOREIGN POL'Y 154, 160 (1986).
135. The Florida International Affairs Act was one of the more far-reaching
efforts to promote international trade. The Act established a commission to make
recommendations regarding state policies relating to "immigration, criminal jus-
tice, human rights, drugs, and other internationally related issues." See FLA. STAT.
Sec. 288.801, 288.804(13) (1991) (repealed 2000).
136. See EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 84 (1998) (discussing efforts by various U.S. cities
to promote international human rights); Shuman, supra note 134, at 160 (same).
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challenged by the national government. Ordinarily the agreements are
allowed to stand unless challenged by an aggrieved private party, as the
Massachusetts law was in Crosby.
3. State and Local Spending Measures
Recently, state spending has been a particular focus of state and local
efforts to give voice to the political concerns of their constituents. State
boycott measures have roots in the Boston Tea Party and other colonial
boycotts against Great Britain. 137 Modern government procurement or
selective purchasing laws such as the Massachusetts measure that condi-
tion the issuance of government contracts serve a number of purposes.
They communicate the moral outrage of .local constituents; raise public
consciousness regarding particular issues; stimulate debate; prevent local
tax revenues from being used to subsidize and implicitly endorse practices
that violate community standards and beliefs; serve as a catalyst for na-
tional, and even international, action on the subject; and ultimately may
help to promote reform in the foreign state.
The federal government historically has tolerated, if not encouraged,
such local actions. In the 1970s, thirteen states adopted anti-boycott laws
opposing the Arab League's boycott of Israel, prior to the adoption of
federal legislation.138 In the 1980s, state and local governments promoted
South African divestment, in express disagreement with the national gov-
ernment's policy of constructive engagement. Sub-national measures ulti-
mately helped to mobilize U.S. support for sanctions against South Africa,
both through national legislation and in the United Nations. By the time
Congress finally adopted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986,139 as many as 140 states, counties and localities had adopted divest-
ment or procurement laws targeting South Africa. 14
137. See generally DiPi HOERDER, CROWD ACTION IN REVOLUTIONARY MASSACHU-
SEr"S, 1765-1780 (1977) (discussing colonial boycotts); Walter H. Conser, Jr., The
Stamp Act Resistance, in RESISTANCE, POLITICS, AND THE AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR IN-
DEPENDENCE, 1765-1775, 22, 31-37 (Walter H. Conser, Jr. et al. eds., 1986) (discuss-
ing stamp act boycotts).
138. See FRY, supra note 136, at 94 (discussing state laws barring "companies
that did business with their state governments from complying with the Arab
League's boycott").
139. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. § 5001, et seq.
(1988), repealed by South African Democratic Transition Support Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-149, § 4(a) (2), 107 Stat. 1505 (2000) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 5001 (4) (c) (1)).
140. See Richard Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 Am. J.
INT'L L. 821, 822 (1989) (identifying twenty-three states, fourteen counties, eighty
cities and Virgin Islands as having adopted anti-apartheid divestment or procure-
ment laws); Earl H. Fry, The U.S. States and Foreign Economic Policy: Federalism in the
'New World Order', in FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE FEDERAL STATES 122, 134 (Brian
Hocking ed., 1993) (noting that there are 140 state and local governments with
policies restricting public funds with respect to South Africa); Kevin P. Lewis, Deal-
ing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local Divestment Legislation, 61
TUL. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987) (identifying nineteen states and sixty-two cities that
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Numerous states and localities presently have government procure-
ment rules that directly or incidentally impact foreign relations. Although
the Massachusetts Burma Law is the most infamous of these provisions,
similar laws targeting Burma have been adopted by more than two dozen
states and municipalities, including Vermont, Los Angeles, San Francisco
and New York City.' 4' Other state and local governments have adopted
human-rights based sanctions against Northern Ireland,'142 Indonesia, Ni-
geria, Cuba and countries engaging in religious persecution.' 14 " Florida
had enacted anti-apartheid bills). The legislation received mixed treatment in the
courts. Compare Bd. of Trs. of the Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Mayor & City Council of
Bait., 562 A.2d 720, 737 (Md. 1989) (upholding constitutionality of city ordinance
requiring divestment of city employee pension funds from companies doing busi-
ness in South Africa), with New York Times Co. v. City of New York Coinm'n on
Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 350 (1977) (rejecting claim that New York Times
had aided and abetted discrimination by publishing South African employment
advertisements).
141. The Organization for International Investment (OFII), a business group
that lobbies against economic sanctions, maintains a website of sub-national sanc-
tions measures. See Organization for International Investment, State and Municipal
Sanctions Report, available at http://www.ofii.org/issues/sanction.cfm [hereinafter
OFII web site] (last visited Sept. 8, 2001).
142. See, e.g., Howard N. Fenton, Ill, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs:
State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 Nw. J. IN'r'L L. & Bus. 563, 567-69
(1993) (noting that fourteen states, including Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York and Rhode Island, and thirty-four cities have enacted advisory or
mandatory divestment laws directed toward firms doing business with Northern
Ireland). New Jersey and New York restrict state purchasing from Northern Ire-
land. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-12.2 (West Supp. 1999) (forbidding bidders for
state contracts from having business operations in Northern Ireland); N.Y. SrATE
FIN. LAw § 165(5) (McKinney 1997) (restricting business operations with Northern
Ireland for bidders on state contracts). Massachusetts restricts public pension in-
vestment in firms that sell weapons or munitions to Northern Ireland. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 23(l)(d) (iii) (West 1996) (restricting investments in fi-
nancial institutions with loans to corporations that engage in military business with
Northern Ireland); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22C, 22D (West 1996) (re-
stricting state entities from procuring goods from North Ireland, but providing
exception for medical supplies).
States restricting investment of state funds in companies doing business in
Northern Ireland include Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, Texas and Vermont. See CONN. GEN. SATr. ANN. § 3-13h (West 1999)
(restricting investment of state funds in corporations doing business in Northern
Ireland); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 121.153 (West 1999) (same); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 32, § 23 (West Supp. 1999) (same); Micvi. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 38.1133a (West
1997) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 11A.241 (West 1997) (same); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 72-1246.06-.08 (1996) (same); N.H. REV. SiAr. ANN. §§ 6:32-:34 (Supp. 1999)
(same); N.J. SrAT. ANN. §§ 52:18A-89.4 to -89.6 (West Supp. 1999) (same); N.Y.
RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 423-a (McKinney 1999) (same); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8527 (West 1992) (same); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5940 (West Supp. 1999)
(same); 72 PA. CONS. STrAr. ANN. § 3773.1 (West 1995) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
35-10-14 (1997) (same); TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 404.024(h) (Vernon 2000)
(same); 1989 VT. Acm's & RESOLVES 50 (same).
143. See OFII web site, supra note 141, at http://www.ofii.org/issues/sanc-
tion.cfm (cataloguing state and local selective purchasing measures); see also Paul
Blustein, Thinking Globally, Punishing Locally; States, Cities Rush to Impose Their Own
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restricts investment of state funds in companies doing business with
Cuba. 14 4 Since 1992, Dade County, Florida also has barred government
contracts with companies doing business with Cuba. The County ex-
panded the provision in 1996 to include Helms-Burton "traffickers."' 4 5
Numerous states and localities impose environmental procurement re-
strictions mandating the use of recycled and energy-efficient materials.14"
Others impose "Buy American" requirements on state and local agen-
cies,' 47 prohibit the use of goods made with sweatshop labor (defined as
child labor, forced labor, sub-living wages and a work week that exceeds
forty-eight hours) 148 and require companies receiving municipal contracts
to pay a living wage. 149 Threats by New York City, New York State and
California to impose restrictions on financial institutions recently spurred
Swiss banks and insurers to settle the claims of Holocaust victims. 151 Gov-
Sanctions, Angering Companies and Foreign Affairs Experts, WAsii. POST, May 16, 1997,
at G1 (discussing state and local governments' adoption of economic sanctions
against foreign regimes); Robert S. Greenberger, State, Cities Increase Use of Trade
Sanctions, Troubling Business Groups and U.S. Partners, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1998, at
A20 (same).
144. See FLA. STrAT. ANN. § 215.471 (West 2001).
145. SeeJim Oliphant, U.S. Appeals Court Ruling Heartens Foes of Dade Law Bar-
ring Cuba Trade, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV.,July 8,1999, at Al (discussing Florida law).
146. See Brief of Nonprofit Organizations, Amici Curiae at *24-25, Natsios v.
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 2000 WL 35838 (1st Cir. Jan. 12, 2000) (No. 99-474).
147. Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma and Tennessee have
some variety of a "Buy American" law. .See IOwA CoDE ANN. § 18.3 (West Supp.
1999) (establishing preference in purchasing American-made products); MD.
CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 17-301-306 (1995) (requiring American steel
products for use in contracts with "a public body"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-188
(Michie 1997) (requiring state agency to purchase cars and trucks assembled in
North America); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 125.09, 125.11, 306.43(G), 5513.07
(West Supp. 1999) (establishing allowable preferences for goods produced in
America); OKI.,\. SrAT. tit. 61, § 51 (1997) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-5-135
(1998) (requiring state agencies to purchase highway materials from American
companies); cf K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774, 789 (N.J. 1977) (upholding constitutionality of state "Buy
American" law on grounds that it did not impose judginent on any foreign state);
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 229 (1969) (inval-
idating state "Buy American" law as conflicting with federal trade policies).
148. San Francisco, Cleveland and North Olmstead, Ohio, and a number of
other cities and counties have laws banning the procurement of products made in
sweatshops. See Pittsburgh Joins City Fight Against Sweatshops, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept.
23, 1998 (discussing Pittsburgh sweatshop ordinance); Linda Himelstein, Going Be-
yond City Limits? Municipalities Are Exercising Their Clout on Social Issues-And Business
Is Balking, Bus. WEEK, July 7, 1997, at 98 (noting passage of San Francisco ordi-
nance); see also OFII web site, supra note 141, at http://wwv.ofii.org/issues/sanc-
tion.cfm (noting enactment of North Olmstead measure).
149. Nearly two dozen cities require companies receiving municipal contracts
to pay their employees a "living wage." See Yumi Wilson, S.F. Sets Up 15-Member
Panel to Study Effect of Living-Wage Law, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1998, at A23 (discuss-
ing San Francisco's support of living-wage ordinance for workers).
150. See Greenberger, supra note 143, at A20 (discussing threat of sanctions
against Swiss Banks); Stephen D. Moore, Choices Few to Swiss Banks on War Crimes,
WALL ST.J., Aug. 18, 1998, at A]2 (same).
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ernment procurement measures also have had some effect on corporate
practices. Motorola pulled out of Burma partially due to a San Francisco
ordinance, 15 1 and Apple Computer and several other companies termi-
nated their Burma operations in response to the Massachusetts statute 1 5 2
4. International Controversy
State and local measures frequently provoke international contro-
versy. One of the primary criticisms of the Massachusetts Burma Law was
the extent to which it provoked objection from the international commu-
nity. The European Communities (EC),' 53 Japan and Thailand con-
demned the sanctions as violating the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).' 15 4 The EC, Japan and
the Association of South East Asian Nations initiated dispute settlement
proceedings in the WTO.155 When discussions with the United States
failed to resolve the Massachusetts issue, Japan and the EC requested the
establishment of a WTO dispute panel. A panel was established in Octo-
ber 1998 over the objection of the United States. 156 Although the WTO
151. See Leslie Goldberg, Motorola Gets Out of Burma, Into City: Firm's Closing of
Office Likely to Net It $40 Million S.Y Radio Contract, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 6, 1996, at
Al (explaining Motorola's decision to shut down its operations).
152. See Frank Phillips, Apple Cites Mass. Law in Burma Decision, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 4, 1996, at B6 (stating "company would end its operations in Burma because
of the Massachusetts law"); see also Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 370 (2000) (noting that three plaintiff member companies had withdrawn
from Burma after passage of Massachusetts law).
153. The European Communities are the official European member of the
WTO.
154. See Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), at http://
www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/gpr-94.pdf [hereinafter Government Pro-
curement Agreement]. The Agreement states that "[a] Party shall not apply rules
of origin to products or services imported or supplied for purposes of government
procurement covered by this Agreement from other Parties, which are different
from the rules of origin applied in the normal course of trade and at the time of
the transaction in question to imports or supplies of the same product or services
from the same Parties." See id. at art. IV (noting WTO rules); see also Brief for the
European Communities and Their Member States at *2-3, Natsios v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 2000 WL 177175 (1st Cir. 2000) (No. 99-474) (discussing Euro-
pean position); Massachusetts Law on Burma Riles EU, Ci-m. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1997, at
A34 (same); A State's Foreign Policy: The Mass That Roared, ECONOMisT, Feb. 8, 1997,
at 32 (same).
155. See United States-Measure Affecting Government Procurement, Request
for Consultations by the European Communities, WT/DS88/1, GPA/D2/1, (June 20,
1997) (noting that proceeding was initiated by European Communities in re-
sponse to Massachusetts Burma Law); United States-Measure Affecting Govern-
ment Procurement, Request for Consultations Iry Japan, WT/DS95/1, GPA/D3/1,
(July 18, 1997) (noting that proceeding was initiated by Japan in response to Mas-
sachusetts Burma Law); World Trade Org., Overview of the State-of-Play of WJ'O Dis-
putes, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/stplay-e.doc (last
visited Sept. 15, 2001) (summarizing dispute settlement proceedings).
156. See Christopher McCrudden, International Economic Law and the Pursuit of
Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of 'Selective Purchasing' Laws
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proceeding was dropped after the U.S. district court invalidated the Massa-
chusetts law, the Supreme Court noted that the EC had indicated its inten-
tion to initiate new WTO proceedings if that decision were not
affirmed. 1
5 7
The European Union, foreign governments and United Nations bod-
ies frequently contend that state and local measures violate international
law, including provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and various international human rights treaties. The EC, for ex-
ample, has objected to numerous sub-national U.S. measures as unlawful
trade practices that conflict with the GATT/WTO system. These measures
include state subsidies, health and safety standards, environmental stan-
dards and taxation of multinational corporate income. 158 A 1994 study
found ninety alleged conflicts between WTO provisions and California
state laws alone.' 59 Canada likewise has complained that various sub-na-
tional U.S. laws, including inspection requirements for goods and food
safety, regulation of alcoholic beverages and newsprint recycling require-
ments, constitute improper trade barriers.' 6 ' California's unitary system
of taxing corporate assets provoked protests by a number of U.S. trading
partners and retaliatory legislation by the United Kingdom. Dozens of for-
eign governments submitted amicus briefs opposing the practice before it
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Barclays Bank. 1"
International bodies and foreign states also have criticized U.S. state
practices relating to police brutality, prison conditions and capital punish-
ment. 162 State executions of foreign nationals who were convicted in vio-
lation of their right to notification under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations have been a particular object of foreign concern in
recent years. Such practices have provoked repeated diplomatic protests
to the United States by foreign governments' 63 as well as several suits
Under the WJ'O Government Procurement Agreement, 2J. INT'L ECON. L. 3, 24-25 (1999)
(discussing WTO dispute over the Massachusetts Burma Law).
157. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 383 n.19.
158. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE
AND INVESTMENT 34-35 (July 2000) (discussing various federal and state direct and
indirect purchasing barriers).
159. See ROBERT STUMBERG, GATT IMPACT ON STATE LAw: CALIFORNIA (Ctr. for
Policy Alternatives, 1994).
160. See Dep't of Foreign Affairs & Int'l Trade, Register of United States Barri-
ers to Trade 13 (1999).
161. See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324 n.22 (1994)
(noting foreign amici).
162. See University of Minnesota, Human Rights Library, Concluding Observa-
tions of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, 03/10/95, CCPR/C/79/
Add.50; A/50/40, paras. 266-304 (expressing, among other things, concern regard-
ing U.S. death penalty practices, police brutality, prison conditions and criminal-
ization of homosexual sodomy), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
usdocs/hrcuscomments.html (last visited July 27, 2001).
163. In the last eight years, fifteen foreign nationals have been executed by
seven states, none of whom had been notified of their rights under the Consular
Convention. The Governor of Oklahoma recently rejected a clemency request for
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against the United States before the World Court. In June 2001, the World
Court ruled that the United States had violated its obligations under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to German nationals on death
row, both by failing to notify them of their right to consular notification
and by failing to allow review of the death sentences in light of the
violation. 164
Foreign states have vigorously condemned the United States for state
executions of juveniles and the mentally disabled as violating U.S. obliga-
tions under fundamental international human rights conventions.' 65 The
European Union has formally objected to over twenty executions in the
United States since 1998.166 Texas' execution of Karla Faye Tucker pro-
voked the European Parliament to adopt a resolution strongly condemn-
ing the execution.'" 7 InJune 2001, the Council of Europe threatened the
United States with loss of its observer status unless the United States dis-
continued capital punishment by 2003.168 Italy and other European gov-
ernments have responded to U.S. state death penalty practices by
prohibiting extradition to the United States of individuals who may face
a Mexican national who had been convicted in "clear violation" of the Convention,
despite Mexico's objection that the decision violated "international law and the
elemental principles of cooperation between nations." See Raymond Bonner, Mexi-
can Killer Is Refused Clemency by Oldahoma, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A8 [hereinaf-
ter Bonner, Clemency]. Mexico filed a formal diplomatic protest with the U.S. State
Department regarding Texas' execution of Miguel Flores as a result of Texas' fail-
ure to notify Flores of his rights under the Convention. See Raymond Bonner, U.S.
Bid to Execute Mexican Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2000, at A20 (quoting Mexi-
can official that practice "is a strain on bilateral relations").
164. See La Grand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 L.C.J. (Order of June 27), avail-
able at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress200l/ipresscom2001-
16_20010627.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2001); see also Concerning the Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 L.CJ. 248 (Order of June 8)
(instituting suit against U.S. for violating Vienna Convention rights of Paraguayan
national).
165. See, e.g., Texas Death-Row Inmate Granted Stay of Execution, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Aug. 16, 2001 (reporting stay of execution for Napoleon Beazley, who was
a juvenile at the time of the crime, and noting support for stay from various na-
tions and human rights groups). Georgia's scheduled execution of Alexander Wil-
liams provoked calls by the European Union and other international groups to
spare Williams because he had been a minor at the time of the crime. See Ray-
mond Bonner, Georgia Execution Is Stayed in Case of Youthful Offender, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2000, at Al 2 (discussing international response); cf Brief of Amici Curiae
Diplomats at 12, McCarver v. North Carolina, 70 U.S.L.W. 3232 (2001) (No. 00-
8727) (arguing that allowing executions of the mentally retarded "will further the
United States' diplomatic isolation and inevitably harm other United States for-
eign policy interests").
166. See European Union, EU Policy & Action on the Death Penalty, available
at http://www.eurtinion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/deathpenlome.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2001) (listing U.S. death row cases in which EU has taken action); see
also Brief of Amici Curiae Diplomats at 9-10, McCarver (No. 00-8727) (discussing
European opposition to execution of mentally retarded).
167. See Spiro, supra note 117, at 1263 (discussing international activism and
death penalty protests).
168. See News in Brief EVENING STANDARI) (London), June 26, 2001, at 6.
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capital charges. 16 9 European Members of Parliament have called for an
investment boycott on states imposing the death penalty, and shareholder
pressure for divestment from such states is increasing in Europe.1
70
III. THE DE FACTO FEDERALISM OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
A. National Deference to States
Despite the potential of state and local activities to provoke interna-
tional conflict, Congress and the President have frequently tolerated, de-
ferred to and in some cases abetted, such policies. The executive branch
has defended state execution practices despite acknowledged breaches of
U.S. treaty obligations and has deferred fully to state government deci-
sions in this area. 17 1 Indeed, in Breard v. Greene,172 which involved a pro-
test in the World Court by Paraguay over Virginia's execution of a
Paraguayan national, the United States argued before the U.S. Supreme
Court that the federal government lacked any authority to halt a state exe-
cution, despite an order for provisional measures from the World
Court. 17-3
The national political branches frequently have tolerated state and
local boycott activities. In the 1970s, Congress allowed measures targeting
the Arab League boycott of Israel to stand until Congress itself adopted
federal legislation barring U.S. entities from participating in the boycott.
Congress then expressly preempted the existing state legislation. 174 Con-
gress declined to preempt the state and local rules targeting apartheid in
South Africa for the two decades that they conflicted with national policy.
Even when national sanctions were imposed on South Africa in 1986, Con-
169. See United Nations, Status of the International Covenants on Human Rights:
Question of the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Com-
mission resolution 1997/12, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Htridocda/
Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/97f35ce9307el b43cl 25661a00435e70?Opendocument
(cataloguing member states' positions on capital punishment, including that of
Italy).
170. See Spiro, supra note 117, at 1263 & n.155 (citing UK Presidency Plays up
Human Rights in Trade Policy, EuR. REP., Feb. 7, 1998 (noting European Parliament
resolution regarding Tucker execution).
171. In one recent case involving a Mexican national on death row who had
been denied Consular Convention notification, for example, the U.S. State Depart-
ment simply asked Oklahoma "to give careful consideration to the representations
of the government of Mexico ... and to consider whether the failure of constlar
notification prejudiced the conviction or sentence." See, e.g., Bonner, Clemency,
supra note 163, at A8.
172. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
173. See Brief for the United States as AmicIs Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-8214 (A-732)) (arguing that federal constitutional
authority to interfere in state capital punishment proceeding was limited to
"persuasion").
174. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(c) (1998)
(providing that federal anti-Arab boycott rules "preempt any law, rule or regula-
tion" indicated).
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gress allowed state and local rules to remain in place. 175 Congress then
voted to permit sub-national governments to enforce their South Africa
selective purchasing laws on federally-funded transportation projects. 176
When the United States lifted its sanctions against South Africa following
the transition to democracy, Congress still did not eliminate the state and
local measures, but merely "urge[d] state and local governments to re-
scind" their legislation. 177
National deference to federalism concerns has been particularly nota-
ble in the treaty context, where the United States frequently has refused to
impose treaty obligations upon state and local governments.1 78 The
175. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440 § 606,
100 Stat. 1086 (preserving state and local measures), repealed by South African Dem-
ocratic Transition Support Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-149, § 4(a)(2), 107 Stat.
1505, 1505 (2000) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 5001(4)(c)(1)). Congress
not only rejected calls to preempt state and local anti-apartheid laws, but the
House of Representatives, after extensive debate over the state and local measures,
passed a resolution stating that the federal sanctions on South Africa should not be
interpreted to preempt any state or local measure, to avoid any concerns about
implied preemption. See H.R. Res. 549, 99th Congress (1986) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 5001) ("[I]t is not the intent of the House of Representatives that the bill
limit, preempt, or affect, in any fashion, the authority of any State or local govern-
ment ... to restrict or otherwise regulate any financial or commercial activity re-
specting South Africa."); H.R. Res. 548, 99th Cong. (1986); see also 132 CONG. REC.
23291, 23291 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting Anti-
Apartheid Act would not preempt state and local action). The Office of Legal
Counsel also issued an opinion that state and local divestment and procurement
laws were not preempted by federal action prior to 1986. See 10 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 65, 86-90 (1986), 1986 WL 213238.
176. See Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers, Urgent
Supplementals, and Correcting Enrollment Errors Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-45,
ch. 9, 103 Stat. 97, 110 (prohibiting withholding of federal finds as result of state
or local anti-apartheid government procurement policies), repealed by South Afri-
can Democratic Transition Support Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-149,
§ 4(c)(2)(A), 107 Stat. 1505, 1506 (2000) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 5001 (4) (c) (1)). The legislation overrode a decision by the U.S. Department of
Transportation to withhold millions in funding from state and local jurisdictions
with anti-apartheid selective purchasing laws on the grounds that these laws vio-
lated federal contract requirements. Id.
177. South African Democratic Transition Support Act of 1993 § 4(c)(1).
178. "In practice, both Congress and the treaty-making power have sometimes
refrained from fully exercising their powers out of respect for state susceptibilities,
and the courts have sometimes given rather strained interpretations to treaties for
the same reason." WRIGHT, supra note 81, at 75. Historically, the Senate has de-
clined to ratify treaties considered to infringe on states' rights, or has required
state consent in order for the treaty to be binding. See id. at 93. The United States
obtained Maine's consent to the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842, which adjusted
the state's boundaries, as a matter of political expediency, if not constitutional
necessity. See id. at 89. An 1853 treaty with France protected the right of French
nationals to own land on equal terms with citizens "in all states of the Union where
existing laws permit it, so long and to the same extent as the said laws shall remain
in force." In all other states, the President promised to "recommend" the passage
of laws necessary to secure the right. Id. at 90 n.79. And in an 1854 treaty with
Great Britain, the United States promised to "urge upon the state governments"
equal rights to use state canals for British subjects. Id. at 31 n.1l.
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United States has declined to extend the obligations of many international
taxation agreements to the states, a fact that was central to the decisions
upholding the validity of state measures in many of the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause cases.179
In ratifying recent human rights conventions such as the Genocide
and Torture Conventions, the Convention Against Race Discrimination
and the ICCPR, the United States expressly adopted federalism declara-
tions and understandings that delegated responsibility for certain U.S. in-
ternational human rights obligations to the states.
The ICCPR, for example, is one of the leading international instru-
ments prohibiting forced labor and the suppression of political speech
such as that in Burma. In consenting to the treaty's ratification, the U.S.
Senate attached a federalism understanding stating as follows:
[T]he United States understands that this Convention shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters cov-
ered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments;, to the
extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over
such matters, the Federal Government shall take measures appro-
priate to the Federal system to the end that the competent authori-
ties of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures for
the fulfillment of the Covenant.1 8(
179. In Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, the Court emphasized that "the
tax treaties into which the United States has entered do not generally cover the
taxing activities of subnational governmental units such as States, and in none of
the treaties does the restriction on 'non-arm's-length' methods of taxation apply to
the states." 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983); see also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 327 (1994) ("Given these indicia of Congress' willingness
to tolerate States' worldwide combined reporting mandates .... we cannot con-
clude that 'the foreign policy of the United States . . . is [so] seriously
threatened[."' (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196)). In Wardair Canada, Inc.
v. Florida Department of Revenue, the Court noted that of the more than seventy
relevant treaties entered by the U.S., none prohibited the states or their subdivi-
sions from taxing airline fuel. The Court concluded that "the United States has at
least acquiesced in state taxation [practices]." 477 U.S. 1, 12; see also Itel Contain-
ers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75 ("The Federal Government, in adopt-
ing various conventions, . . . has chosen to eliminate state taxes collected in
connection with the importation of cargo containers.").
180. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Ratification Resolu-
tion, 138 CONG. REc. S4781-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (emphasis added); accord
U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. REc. S14,326
(daily ed. June 24, 1994); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratifi-
cation of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG. REG. S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
For the text of these Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings to Human
Rights Treaties, see University of Minnesota, Human Rights Library, available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/usres.html. For the Senate Report dis-
cussing the ICCPR reservation, see INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITI-
CAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 1-24; OTHER SENATE REPORTS:
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The provision thus relegates to the states authority for enforcing human
rights obligations with respect to matters within their legislative and judi-
cial jurisdiction. 181
The Constitution of the International Labour Organization (ILO)
likewise contains a federalism clause that defers to sub-national authori-
ties. 182 The United States Representative to the ILO has interpreted the
clause as follows:
Where, in a country with a Federal Government like our own, it is
decided that the subject of a convention comes under the juris-
diction of the constituent states as well as the federal authority,
that particular convention is treated like a recommendation. It is
referred to the state for such action as they care to take.
18 3
ILO Convention Number 105,184 to which the United States has acceded,
prohibits the use of forced labor, which is one of the most persistent
human rights violations in Burma. In an unprecedented step, the ILO
recently called upon world governments, businesses and trade unions to
review their relations with Burma to ensure that their actions did not per-
petuate the system of forced labor, and to take additional actions to try to
stop the use of forced labor in that country.' 85 The ILO convention and
request, which is binding on states through the Supremacy Clause, com-
bined with the U.S. federalism provision, gives states a valid interest in
ensuring that their procurement policies do not contribute to the use of
forced labor in Burma.
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMI.
NATION, S. EXEC. REP. No. 103-29, at 24 (1994); CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. REP.
No. 101-30, at 2 (1990).
181. But see Carlos Manuel V~zquez, Breard, Printz and the Treaty Power, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1354-56 (1999) (arguing federalism understandings are un-
constitutional under Supreme Court's anti-commandeering jurisprudence).
182. See Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Aug. 2, 1948,
art. 19.7, 62 Stat. 3485, 3522, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, 70, 72 (addressing application of ILO
conventions to federal states).
183. To Abolish Forced Labor Through ILO, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor
and Pub. Welfare on S.. Res. 117, 84th Cong. 249-50 (1956) (statement of Philip M.
Kaiser, Former Assistant Sec'y of Labor and United States Gov't Representative on
the ILO Governing Body).
184. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105),June
25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
185. See International Labour Organization, Resolution on the Widespread Use of
Forced Labour in Myanmar, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/
ilc/ilc87/com-myan.htm (june 1999) (last visited Sept. 8, 2001) (addressing con-
cerns regarding forced labor in Myanmar). In November 2000, the ILO Gov-
erning Body reaffirmed the resolution and called upon ILO members to ensure
that their relations with the Burmese government "do not perpetuate or extend
the system of forced or compulsory labour in that country." International Labour
Organization, ILO Governing Body Opens the Way for Unprecedented Action Against
Forced Labour in Myanmar, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureaul/inf/pr/
2000/44.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001).
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The United States was similarly deferential to state interests in ratify-
ing the GATT/WTO system. The United States' accession to the WTO in
1994 raised a number of potential conflicts with state regulations regard-
ing food and product safety, banking and insurance, and local taxes and
subsidies. The WTO Government Procurement Agreement, 18 6 in particu-
lar, raised the potential for conflict with the exercise of traditional state
authority. The national government insulated states from GATT/WTO
obligations in three ways.
First, rather than simply imposing the GPA obligations on the states,
the United States invited individual states to voluntarily consent to the
Agreement. Thirty-seven states agreed to do so, including Massachusetts,
though many qualified their consent in significant ways. Massachusetts
Governor William Weld, for example, informed the United States Trade
Representative that "Massachusetts has no present intention of going
against the agreement."'18 7 The national government had, it would seem,
constitutional authority to impose the GPA and other GATT obligations
on states through the Supremacy Clause' 8 8 and could have avoided any
tensions created by non-acceding states by doing so.
Second, in implementing the GATT/WTO agreement into domestic
law, Congress provided that the agreement was not self-executing, and fur-
ther provided that the federal legislation would not itself override state
law. Additional legislation was required to accomplish this purpose. 189 Fi-
nally, Congress barred private parties from enforcing GATIT/WTO obliga-
tions against state and local governments. Domestic enforcement
authority instead was restricted to the executive branch, thus leaving the
decision whether to challenge a state's economic policies to the Presi-
dent's exclusive discretion. 1  The Statement of Administrative Action
186. See supra note 154.
187. See Letter from William F. Weld, Governor, Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, to Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative (Dec. 3, 1993), quoted in
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371
(1998) (No. 97-8214 (A-732)). Massachusetts ultimately committed a select group
of executive agencies to honor the agreement. See World Trade Organization,
Annex I1: Sub-Central Government Entities Which Procure in Accordance with
the Provisions of This Agreement), Mar. 1, 2000 (WT/Let/330), available at http:/
/www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproce/usa-2.doc (last visited Sept. 8, 2001)
(detailing states bound by agreement).
188. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920) (holding that fed-
eral legislation enacted pursuant to treaty may override state authority).
189. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) § 102(a)(1), 19 U.S.C.
§ 3512 (2000) ("No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements... that is
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect."); id. § 102(a) (2)
("Nothing in this Act shall be construed-.., to amend or modify any law of the
United States . . .unless specifically provided for in this Act.").
190. See id. § 102 (limiting private remedies tinder Uruguay Round Agree-
ments to "no person other than the United States" and providing that "[i]t is the
intention of Congress . . . to occupy the field with respect to any cause of action or
defense under . .. the Uruguay Round Agreements"); H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at
676 (1994) (same), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 4055 (codified as amended
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(SAA) accompanying the implementing legislation provides that WTO
rules may not be used "directly or indirectly" in a private action, including
an action based on "Congress' Commerce Clause authority."'19 1 The SAA
further emphasizes:
With respect to the states, section 102(c) represents a determina-
tion by the Congress and the Administration that private lawsuits
are not an appropriate means for ensuring state compliance with
the Uruguay Round Agreements. Suits of this nature may inter-
fere with the President's conduct of trade and foreign relations
and with suitable resolution of disagreements or disputes under
those agreements. 1
92
The decision by Congress and the Executive to expressly bar private ac-
tions against states to enforce U.S. international trade commitments ap-
pears to reflect the political desire to protect state activity in this area, as
well as to insulate the GATT instruments from private efforts to interpret
their terms.
In short, the longstanding practice of the national political branches
has been to tolerate many state and local actions that may impact U.S.
foreign relations, and to carve out room for state autonomy and responsi-
bility with respect to U.S. treaty obligations.
IV. DEFERENCE TO THE STATES AND THE CROSBY DECISION
Federal deference to sub-national actions contributed to the Burma
dispute in two ways. First, U.S. approaches to its treaty obligations bol-
stered Massachusetts' interest in promoting human rights through its state
purchasing policies. Second, U.S. practices invited non-compliance by the
states with GAT'/WTO obligations. The federal government has author-
ity to override state activities with respect to both of these points. But in
the absence of express invalidation by the national political branches, U.S.
practice granted states substantial room for independent action that was
entitled to deferential treatment by the courts.
A. State Interests in Human Rights Compliance
An important question presented by Crosby is whether measures such
as the Massachusetts law promote any legitimate local concern when they
impact conduct outside the state's borders. As noted previously, in Crosby,
at 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (a) (2) (1994)); see also David W. Leebron, Implementation of the
Uruguay Round Results in the United States, in IMPLEMENTING TiIE URUGUAY ROUND
175, 228-29 (John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1996) (discussing safeguards in
implementing legislation to protect state sovereignty).
191. H.R. Doc. No. 103-316. The Statement of Administrative Action for the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act constitutes the "authoritative expression by the
United States concerning the interpretation and application of the [URAA] in any
judicial proceeding." 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d).
192. H.R. Doc:. No. 103-316, at 676.
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the Court of Appeals denied this possibility, 19 3 and the Supreme Court
avoided the question. But government procurement laws such as the Mas-
sachusetts Burma statute may be viewed from a number of perspectives.
First, the measure could be considered a communicative effort by the
State to condemn Burma's human rights practices. Second, the provision
may have sought to prevent Massachusetts' expenditures from contribut-
ing to human rights abuse and to protect the state from the "moral taint"
suffered from dealing with firms that do business with Burma. 19 4 The fi-
nal and potentially the most controversial purpose might be to promote
compliance with international human rights abroad by altering the Bur-
mese government's conduct.
9 5
Governments have a valid interest in engaging in communicative ac-
tivities, whether protected by the First Amendment'9" or as a result of
their status as sovereigns. But while communication is a legitimate state
interest, a state's communicative purpose of condemning Burma's human
rights practices could be served simply by adopting a resolution decrying
the government's use of forced labor and torture and suppression of de-
mocracy. One therefore might argue that the Massachusetts procurement
measure was unjustifiable for this purpose.' 9 7
Massachusetts' goal of avoiding complicity in the Burmese govern-
ment's conduct, however, cannot readily be served in any other manner.
193. See discussion supra note 10 and accompanying text.
194. See Brief for Petitioners, Natsios v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 2001 WL
35850, at * 31 (1st Cir. Jan. 12, 2000) (No. 99-474) ("While one purpose of the
Burma Law is indirectly to encourage change in Burma ..... [t]he law is also
intended to disassociate the Massachusetts government and its tax dollars from the
denial of human rights in Burma.").
195. The City of Berkeley, California's measure, for example, sought "to pro-
mote universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, [and to] rec-
ognize the responsibility of local communities to take positive steps to support the
rule of law and to help end injustices and egregious violations of human rights
wherever they may occur." BERKELEY, CAL. RES. 57,881-N.S., IA (1995). Berkeley
was the first municipality to enact a selective purchasing law for Burma. The
Berkeley Resolution bars contracts for services or commodities from companies
doing business with Burma "until the City Council determines that the people of
Burma have become self-governing." Id. at IIIB & IVB.
196. See generally Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives
and Free Speech: The First Amendment As an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. j. INT'.
L. 1 (1999) (arguing that state and local "resolutions criticizing foreign regimes
and purchasing and investment decisions based on foreign policy criteria are ex-
pressive activity beyond the reach of the federal government's preemptive author-
ity"). The Supreme Court has suggested that public entities may have First
Amendment rights and interests. SeeArk. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666 (1998); see also Akhil Amar, A State's Right, a Government's Wrong, WASH.
POST, Mar. 19, 2000, at BI (stating that "Massachusetts' money is a form of speech,
communicating its condemnation in a dramatically expressive way.").
197. On the other hand, the First Amendment protects speech that could
have been made in a less offensive way. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (holding that state improperly prohibited wearing of jacket stating "Fuck
the draft").
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Massachusetts' desire to avoid using public funds to support morally offen-
sive practices would seem to be a legitimate local interest. 193 States have a
legitimate interest in engaging in the economy as market participants. 199
And certainly Massachusetts' decisions regarding the use of its own local
funds constitute an area of traditional state power. In the present case,
the funds at issue were collected locally and distributed locally to serve
local interests through such traditional state functions as road construc-
tion, law enforcement, public services and education. The First Circuit's
conclusion that Massachusetts had no legitimate interest in avoiding
"moral taint" in its state expenditures thus appears too facile.
Finally, even with respect to the goal of promoting human rights
abroad, Massachusetts appears to have had some valid interest, at least in
the absence of federal law precluding such action. U.S. treaties impose
obligations on state and local governments to promote respect for interna-
tional human rights themselves in areas of state authority.
U.S. treaty obligations to promote compliance with international
human rights are binding on the several states, both as a matter of the
treaty text,2"11 through the Supremacy Clause and through federalism pro-
visions adopted by the Senate.2 11' Burma has been targeted extensively,
both by the United States and by the international community, for the use
of forced labor, suppression of political speech and other fundamental
human rights violations. 202 The United States has ratified a number of
treaties prohibiting such conduct, including the ICCPR and various inter-
national agreements barring the use of forced labor.2 °  Through federal-
ism clauses, the government has authorized the states to enforce these
198. See Bd. of Trs. of the Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Mayor & City Council of
Bait., 562 A.2d 720, 755 (Md. 1989) (recognizing that "legitimate, local public in-
terests" served by Baltimore's decision to divest city pension funds from firms do-
ing business in South Africa, included "the local interest in . . . ensuring that
pension funds are invested in a socially responsible manner [and the desire of] the
City and its citizens to distance themselves from the moral taint of ... help[ing] to
maintain South Africa's system of racial discrimination").
199. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandra Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (finding
that dormant interstate commerce clause analysis may not apply fully where state
acts as market participant). The applicability of the market participant doctrine to
the Foreign Commerce Clause is unclear. Cf Trojan Tech., Inc. v. Pennsylvania,
916 F.2d 903, 909-13 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that market participant exception
protects state "Buy American" law from Foreign Commerce Clause preemption).
200. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 87, art. 50 ("The provisions of the present
Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or
exceptions.").
201. For a discussion of the ICCPR and ILO federalism understandings, see
supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of the international, regional, national, subnational and
private efforts to target human rights abuses in Burma, see Sarah H. Cleveland,
Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7-20 (2001).
203. The United States is party to the ILO Convention Concerning the Aboli-
tion of Forced Labour (No. 105), supra note 184; the 1926 Convention to Suppress
the Slave Trade and Slavery, 46 Stat. 2183, 2191, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, 263 (entered into
force Sept. 25, 1926); and the 1957 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
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principles within their areas of jurisdictional competence. The ICCPR
federalism understanding, for example, delegates to state and local gov-
ernments the authority to implement U.S. obligations under the ICCPR
through means subject to their own legislative and judicial jurisdiction.204
This jurisdiction surely would extend to decisions by Massachusetts regard-
ing how to spend its own money in the conduct of governmental opera-
tions, including the decision whether state purchasing dollars may be used
to target forced labor in Burma.
None of this is to suggest that the national government lacks the power
to prevent a state from conditioning its procurement decisions as Massa-
chusetts did. Massachusetts conceded, as it must, that the national govern-
ment possessed authority to preempt its law. 20 - But where legitimate state
interests are involved, and in the absence of federal law invalidating such
state activity, the Court should have at least considered the state interests
at stake in evaluating the measure's incompatibility with national policy.
B. States and International Trade Obligations
National deference to the states in acceding to the WTO also under-
mined the claim that Massachusetts improperly was infringing on U.S. in-
ternational trade obligations. The strongest argument for invalidating the
Massachusetts law was the criticism by the EC and other nations that the
Massachusetts statute violated the Government Procurement Agreement.
The EC appeared as an amicus in Crosby to object to the Massachusetts
statute on this ground, and all three courts cited the Massachusetts stat-
ute's potential conflict with the GPA in support of invalidating the
statute. 206
This argument was weak in the Crosby context for several reasons.
First, the courts were not entitled to consider the National Foreign Trade
Council's claim that the law violated GATT rules, since Congress has
barred private domestic enforcement of those obligations. Furthermore,
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery', 266
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 7, 1956).
204. For discussion of the ICCPR federalism understanding, see supra notes
180-81 and accompanying text.
205. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 n.7 (2000)
("The State concedes, as it must, that in addressing the subject of the federal Act,
Congress has the power to preempt the state statute."); Wis. Dep't of Indus. v.
Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 287 (1986) (rejecting argument that state's "statutory
scheme ... escapes preemption because it is an exercise of the State's spending
power...").
206. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 382-83 & nn.18, 19 (noting that EU had warned
that state law "could have a damaging effect on bilateral EU-US relations," that it
was issue of "serious concern," was "threatening relations with the United States,"
and that EU had threatened to reinstitute WTO proceedings if the law were up-
held); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.2d 38, 52-53 (1st Cir. 1999)
(regarding constitutionality of Massachusetts Burma Law), affd sub norn., Crosby,
530 U.S. 363 (2000); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291
(discussing law's "disruptive impact on foreign relations").
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it is by no means clear that the Massachusetts rule violated the GPA. The
Procurement Agreement has not been construed by the WTO to date, and
its language on this point is subject to interpretation. 20 7 More impor-
tantly, as noted above, the United States has not made the GPA automati-
cally binding on the states. With U.S. tolerance, if not encouragement,
thirteen states have declined to accept the GPA altogether, and many
others have only partially embraced it. 2 ° 8 Given the United States' defer-
ential approach to state compliance with the GPA, a state that chose not to
accept the GPA, and then acted contrary to its requirements, would violate
no domestic or WTO obligation. All of these considerations suggest that
the Court protested too much over the international controversy.
C. National Deference to the Massachusetts Burma Law
In addition to the general deference to state authority discussed
above, the national political branches consistently have deferred to the
Massachusetts law. Their conduct suggests that, at least in the eyes of Con-
gress and the Executive, the addition of Massachusetts' voice to the Burma
sanctions chorus could be tolerated. The United States repeatedly has
condemned, and continues to condemn, Burma's forced labor and other
human rights practices. Indeed, Burma is one of the primary targets of
U.S. sanctions. 2 9 As discussed below, in light of the federal government's
tolerance of the Massachusetts law, the Supreme Court reasonably could
have concluded, as the district court did, that the Massachusetts law com-
plemented both U.S. international human rights obligations generally and
the United States' specific policies toward Burma.2"1
The Massachusetts law did differ from the federal law by applying to
state procurement policies (an area that the national government does
not regulate), to contracts for goods and services and to non-U.S. persons
and companies. Congress, however, had taken no action to suggest that
these differences conflicted in any way with federal policy. Massachusetts
adopted its statute three months before the Federal Burma Statute was
passed; yet, nothing in the federal law purported to override the Massa-
chusetts provision. The federal law's silence on this point is notable, as
207. See generally Christopher McCrudden, supra note 156, at 35-46 (arguing
that state selective purchasing laws for human rights purposes may not violate
CPA).
208. For state adherence to the GPA, see World Trade Organization, supra
note 187, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproce/usa-2.doc.
209. See Cleveland, supra note 202, at 9-11 (discussing U.S. policies toward
Burma); see also U.S. Dept. of State, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, State-
inent on Burma, Jan. 18, 2001, available at http://secretary.state.gov/www/state-
ments/2001/010118.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001) (reaffirming U.S.
commitment to promoting democracy and human rights in Burma, and calling on
ILO members to "consider additional measures, including trade sanctions, to re-
spond to the ILO's call to action").
210. See Bake, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 293 ("The evidence does not establish suffi-
cient actual conflict for this court to find implied preemption.").
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Congress must be presumed to have been aware of the controversial state
statute. Moreover, although Congress has considered other sanctions re-
form legislation in recent years, none of its proposals purported to pre-
empt state and local government procurement provisions, despite
lobbying on this issue by business groups such as the Organization for
International Investment. 21 1
Indeed, when the EC and Japan lodged complaints regarding the
Massachusetts law in -the WTO, Congress responded by proposing to insu-
late the states still further. Congress could have adopted legislation re-
quiring Massachusetts to conform its law to the financial caps set forth in
the GPA or to limit the law's application to non-GPA members. Rather
than chastise Massachusetts, however, Congress considered barring even
the executive branch from challenging state and local laws as conflicting
with U.S.-GATT obligations.2 12 Members of Congress also appeared as
amici on both sides of the Crosby litigation. In short, Congress had numer-
ous opportunities both to expressly preempt the state law and to express
its disagreement with the provision. Congress' failure to take any action
with regard to the Massachusetts law, other than to rally in support of the
state, suggests that a majority of Congress believed that the Massachusetts
voice in this area could be tolerated.
The President, likewise, could have expressly preempted the Massa-
chusetts law, but failed to do so. Current case law establishes that execu-
tive officials, when acting within the scope of their delegated authority,
may preempt state law. 2 13 Both the Federal Burma Statute and the IEEPA
delegated broad authority to the President, which he exercised by impos-
ing sanctions on Burma. These statutes reasonably conferred on the Presi-
211. In 1997, a sanctions bill that was intended to restrict federal sanctions
practices did not limit state and local measures, even though in introducing the
legislation, the sponsor noted that "roughly 20 States and localities have adopted
laws prohibiting government commercial dealings with United States or foreign
companies that do business with countries that have poor human rights records,"
and that "in addition to antagonizing foreign governments, some of our State and
local sanctions raise difficult questions concerning the constitutional authority to
conduct U.S. trade and foreign policy." See 143 CONG. REc. E2080 (daily ed. Oct.
23, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hamilton) (introducing Enhancement of Trade, Security
and Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 2708, 105th Cong. (1997)).
212. In August 1998, the House of Representatives nearly adopted a measure
that would have barred the federal government from challenging any state or local
law as violating an international agreement. See McCrudden, supra note 156, at 26.
In September 1997, the House of Representatives had approved a bill appropriat-
ing $1 million to the U.S. Trade Representative to report to Congress and state
and local governments about any foreign complaint in the WTO that could affect
U.S. laws. See id. (discussing H.R. 2267).
213. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (stating
"federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority
may preempt state regulation"); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141,159 (1982) (finding federal regulation preempted state law); see also
Young, supra note 126, at 171 ("Under current law .... executive officials acting
within the scope of their delegated authority have the power to preempt state
law.").
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dent the power to override conflicting state legislation. 2 14 Or, if the
President was concerned about possible conflict between the Massachu-
setts law and the GPA, he, like Congress, could have required Massachu-
setts to conform its law to the GPA requirements by satisfying the W[O
financial caps or applying the law only to non-GPA members.
Thus, the Crosby Court's assumption that the Massachusetts law would
"compromise" the President's effectiveness by restricting his options in the
foreign affairs arena was misplaced. 21 5 If and when the Executive found
the law to interfere with his authority vis-,-vis Burma, he easily could have
eliminated the conflict. Furthermore, if the Executive was concerned that
the Massachusetts law conflicted with U.S. international trade obligations,
he could have initiated a WTO suit against Massachusetts under the WTO
implementing legislation. Alternatively, the Executive could have allowed
the EC and Japan's challenge to the Massachusetts law in the WTO to
proceed. The Executive found no cause to take any of these actions.
In sum, both Congress and the Executive had numerous opportuni-
ties to expressly preempt or otherwise eliminate the conflict posed by the
Massachusetts law, if either branch found it important to the national in-
terest to do so. Neither branch took any such action. Instead, the consti-
tutionality of the Massachusetts law was presented to the Court in private
litigation, in the face of the apparent unwillingness of the President and
Congress to take action against the legislation and with a background of
federal deference to state procurement rules in general and to the Massa-
chusetts law in particular. Under these circumstances, as the Barclays Bank
Court found, the Court reasonably could, and I believe should, have con-
cluded that the political branches had "passively indicat[ed]" that the state
law did not impair federal uniformity or otherwise unreasonably infringe
on the national foreign affairs powers.2 1"
Instead, the Court applied the "one-voice" doctrine to hold that the
state law was barred by implied statutory preemption. By assuming that no
state voices could be tolerated in this area, the Court failed to recognize
the de facto lenience that Congress and the Executive have bestowed on
states in general, and on Massachusetts in particular, to adopt legislation
such as the Burma law. The Court also failed to consider the valid inter-
ests of state and local governments in engaging in political expression,
acting as market participants, and honoring U.S. human rights obliga-
tions. The decision accordingly reaches far beyond the Framers' primary
concern of ensuring that the national government had authority to prevent
states from interfering in the foreign affairs area.
In fact, the Court's reliance on the "one-voice" doctrine was suffi-
ciently broad that the Court might have reached the same conclusion in
214. Cf Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671 (1981) (upholding
broad executive authority under IEEPA).
215. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000).
216. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 323 (1994).
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the absence of the Federal Burma Statute. 2 17 One possible interpretation
of Crosby is that any action or inaction by Congress with respect to sanc-
tions against Burma would have occupied the entire field, leaving no room
for state activity that differed, however slightly, from the national policy.
From this vantage, if Congress had never adopted the federal law, the
Court still could have found that Congress had either considered and re-
jected, or declined to consider, sanctions against Burma, and that the
"one-voice" doctrine prevented any alternative state voice. The Court's
willingness to invalidate a state measure that was perceived as digressing
from federal policy, however incidentally, is more akin to foreign affairs
preemption in Zschernig than to the simple statutory preemption the Court
purported to apply.
Although the Crosby decision can be interpreted this broadly, such a
reading would have serious implications far beyond the scope of the Mas-
sachusetts Burma law, and potentially disrupt two centuries of constitu-
tional practice in foreign relations. A conclusion that state laws
implicating foreign relations are invalid, even in the absence of a federal
statute directly addressing the subject, would have required invalidation of
the pre-1986 state anti-apartheid laws, despite the fact that Congress ulti-
mately allowed those provisions to stand.2 1" Because the decision in Crosby
fundamentally misconstrues the dynamic relationship between the states
and federal government relating to Burma, the decision preferably should
be overruled or abandoned. At the very least, Crosby should not be inter-
preted to allow implied preemption whenever any state law diverges from
federal policy, however minimally, and regardless of federal deference to
the state activity or the state interests involved. A preferable reading of
Crosby would require a federal statute (or an executive order) that directly
conflicts with the matter addressed by state legislation. 2 9 It is also worth
noting that, absent remedial action from the Court, Congress could re-
verse Crosby and avoid such judicial overreaching in the future by attaching
217. See Carlos Manuel Vzquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1259,
1293 (2001) ("The sort of relationship between state and federal law that the
Court found sufficient to require the invalidation of the Massachusetts Burma Law
arguably would have been present in the absence of any federal statute."). But seeJack
Goldsmith, Statutoy Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 175, 215 (2001)
(arguing that Crosby "has no implications for state international relations activities
beyond state laws regulating transactions in Burma").
218. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
219. Even this approach, of course, is rife with difficulties, given the number
of federal trade, foreign assistance, and other laws that address U.S. relations with
foreign states that could be pointed to as differing from a state measure. Cf David
R. Schmahmann, James Finch & Tia Chapman, Off the Precipice: Massachusetts Ex-
pands its Foreign Policy Expedition from Burma to Indonesia, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAr'L L.
1021, 1027-31 (1997) (arguing that federal policies providing aid to Indonesia
under generalized system of preferences and fostering trade through Export-Im-
port Bank and International Rubber Agreement, and Congress' consideration and
rejection of trade sanctions against Indonesia, should preempt state selective
purchasing laws targeting Indonesia).
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a boilerplate rider to future sanctions regimes that expressly approves state
procurement measures. There is precedent for such measures in the fed-
eral South African sanctions and repeal. To the extent that such savings
clauses were routinely adopted, they would better reflect constitutional al-
locations than anything in Crosby."2 2 °
V. CONCLUSION
In Crosby, the Court missed an opportunity to give an honest and
searching examination to the complex relationship between states and the
national government over foreign affairs. The Court's presumption that
the United States does and must speak with one voice in foreign affairs
overlooked the United States' long history of tolerance for state activity in
this area. It also neglected the extent to which the national political
branches had both created the opportunity for states to add their voices to
the Burma sanctions chorus and had tolerated the specific state measure
in this case. The Court thus failed to recognize the possibility and the
reality that state and local voices do not inherently clash with national pol-
icy, but may instead help to promote a richer harmony of action by the
United States as a whole. The ultimate power of the national government
to silence Massachusetts was not in question; its constitutional authority to
do so is clear. But where the national branches have tolerated and abetted
a chorus that includes the states, the Court should not employ implied
preemption to protect the political branches from having to exercise the
authority they have been constitutionally granted.
220. Cf Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theoty and Practice:
Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEo. L. J. 373
(1994) (arguing in favor of constitutional interpretation by governmental officers
outside courts).
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